Expectations of real political change in Burma are so low that any electoral preparations appear as a sign of movement. Election laws the regime announced this week point to an election taking place some time this year. It would be the first in two decades. The best that can be said is that, without elections, the country will not be able to start moving forward. It is one of many conditions to fulfil before transition to any political normalcy can begin. Is the military government setting the stage for, in United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon's exhortative words, the "most credible, inclusive and transparent" polls?
Not by a long shot. One of the election laws seems aimed specifically at opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It requires her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to expel her as she is serving a suspended sentence under house arrest. Without her participation, the vote cannot have much credibility. She remains a symbol of resistance, a political force whose exclusion cannot be justified. Neither can elections be seen as inclusive if the other 2,000 political prisoners are unable to contest the polls. With her and them off the ballot, voters' choice will be drastically limited, if not largely predetermined. An election commission will have "final and conclusive" say on all electoral matters, according to the authorities, but its five members have to be approved by the junta. So much for fairness and transparency.
The regime obviously has not formulated the laws for an open referendum on its legitimacy. Burma is one of the longest standing examples of countries habituated by military rule and the excesses that usually go with it. Regime survival remains paramount. The military has learnt from the 1990 NLD election landslide how easily it can be supplanted. Yet, the generals have evidently felt the need to appear to the people as well as the international community as moving in the desired direction. Some of the pressure comes from its Asean fellow members. Together with the United States' willingness to give engagement a chance, there is also some opportunity for flexibility. At the same time, to rely on the US as a counterweight against growing Chinese influence, the regime has to appear palatable to Western opinion.
Long though the wait has been, more time has to pass and more persuasion is needed before the regime will dare to embark on substantive reforms. If what it takes is for elections to be weighted overwhelmingly in its favour for it to gain confidence in bringing change, then the upcoming exercise, if it happens, may be of some worth. Beyond that, expectations have to be realistic, if not as low as before.
